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Federal, State Privilege
Proposals Compared
I. INTRODUCTION
Consideration of the Proposed Nebraska Rules of Evidence (here-
inafter "Nebraska Rule[s]," "Nebraska proposal" or "Rule[s]")
by the Nebraska Legislature probably will not attract much public
attention outside the trial bar and bench. If any portion of these
rules merits widespread public debate, however, it is Article V on
privilege, since this Article arguably will have significant impact
outside the courtroom. The various evidentiary privileges granted
to communications between attorney and client, husband and wife,
doctor and patient, person and clergyman, and the privileges
granted for tenor of one's political vote, trade secrets, state secrets
and identity of a government informer rest upon the value judg-
ment that ascertainment of the truth in a trial is subordinate to
other societal goals. Each value judgment subordinating judicial
decision-making to another value in turn rests upon certain as-
sumptions about the connection between the granting of a privilege
and the fostering of desired behavior.
Debate about these assumptions is certainly a public matter and
should not be limited to minds disciplined by the vagaries of the
common law. Yet attorneys who are schooled in the common law
have something unique to offer to public debate on such questions.
Attorneys have lived most intimately with the day-to-day effects
of the rules of privilege on the ascertainment of truth at trial.
They also are knowledgeable about what values the common law
protects in preference to truth-seeking and what alternatives have
been proposed by thoughtful jurists. Since this is a federal system
with both state and federal courts, attorneys are aware of the prob-
lems that arise when different value judgments are made by state
and federal judges with jurisdiction over similar types of societal
disputes.
* B.A. 1966, M.A. 1967, Catholic University of America; J.D. 1973, Uni-
versity of Michigan. Law Clerk to Judge Warren K. Urbom.
374 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 53, NO. 3 (1974)
This article is intended to focus the legal debate on issues sur-
rounding evidentiary privileges in the proposed Nebraska Rules,
through analysis of these privileges under existing Nebraska law
and the corresponding Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence (here-
inafter "Federal Rule[s]" or "federal proposal"). Such a discus-
sion is complicated by the fact that the Federal Rules on privilege
are undergoing major revisions in the United States Congress.
Thus, the comparable Federal Rules on privilege are likely to vary
considerably from those which appear in the commentary to the
Nebraska proposal.
Part II of this article will discuss the revisions which have been
made in the proposed Federal Rules on privilege. It will bring
the commentary on federal law accompanying the Nebraska Rules
up to date with federal law as now proposed. Parts III through XV
will analyze the Nebraska Rules and their counterparts in federal
law. To facilitate analysis, the federal case law on the various
privileges will be considered in the order in which the privileges
are codified in the Nebraska Rules. Such a comparison will point
out possible alternatives to the positions taken by the Nebraska pro-
posal and thus promote debate on these rules. Part XVI will dis-
cuss the need for uniformity between the federal and state rules of
evidence on privilege.
II. EMERGING FEDERAL APPROACH
TOWARD PRIVILEGE
The notes accompanying the proposed Nebraska Rules serve as
an adequate guide to the rules of privilege under Nebraska com-
mon law. But these notes are no longer adequate in comparing
the Nebraska proposal to federal law. Such a comparison is a cru-
cial prerequisite to debate on the hard value questions posed by
the codification of the law of evidence. The Nebraska Rules were
drafted with the federal proposal as a model in those areas where
the Nebraska drafters felt the policy judgments of the Federal
Rules were correct. Even in areas of disagreement, the Federal
Rules play a significant role in understanding the Nebraska Rules
since these rules are explained by contrast to the proposed Federal
Rules. This concern with contrasting federal law is reasonable
since attorneys of this state practice in both courts and in several
circumstances may choose between the two forums in filing suit.
The commentary to the Nebraska proposal would be a sufficient
examination of the corresponding Federal Rules of privilege if the
form of the Federal Rules used as a model would become law. The
Federal Rules used as a model by the Nebraska drafters were those
rules prepared by the Advisory Committee on Rules of Evidence
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of the Judicial Conference of the United States and approved by
the United States Supreme Court on November 20, 1972, before
being sent to Congress. Since that time, the Federal Rules in the
area of privilege have been radically revised by Congress. The
House has passed overwhelmingly1 and sent to the Senate H.R.
54632 which compresses the original thirteen rules of Article V into
one rule:
Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United
States or provided by Act of Congress or in rules prescribed by
the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority, the privilege
of a witness, person, government, State, or political subdivision
thereof shall be governed by the principles of the common law
as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in
the light of reason and experience. However, in civil actions and
proceedings, with respect to an element of a claim or defense as
to which State law supplies the rule of decision, the privilege of
a witness, person, government, State or political subdivision
thereof shall be determined in accordance with State law.3
The commentary accompanying the revised Article V has been re-
duced to three paragraphs in the Report of the Committee on the
Judiciary, accompanying the bill on the rules of evidence.4 While
1. The vote was 377 in favor, 13 opposed and 39 not voting. 120 CoNG.
REc. H569 (daily ed. Feb. 6, 1974).
2. H.R. 5463, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1973) [hereinafter H.R. 5463].
3. 120 CONG. REc. H549 (daily ed. Feb. 6, 1974).
4. H.R. REP. No. 650, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 8-9 (1973). The relevant para-
graphs are as follows:
Article V
Article V as submitted to Congress contained thirteen
Rules. Nine of those Rules defined specific nonconstitutional
privileges which the federal courts must recognize (i.e. re-
quired reports, lawyer-client, psychotherapist-patient, hus-
band-wife, communications to clergymen, political vote, trade
secrets, secrets of state and other official information, and
identity of informer). Another Rule provided that only those
privileges set forth in Article V or in some other Act of Con-
gress could be recognized by the federal courts. The three
remaining Rules addressed collateral problems as to waiver
of privilege by voluntary disclosure, privileged matter dis-
closed under compulsion or without opportunity to claim
privilege, comment upon or inference from a claim of privi-
lege, and jury instruction with regard thereto.
The Committee amended Article V to eliminate all of the
Court's specific Rules on privileges. Instead, the Committee,
through a single Rule 501, left the law of privileges in its
present state and further provided that privileges shall con-
tinue to be developed by the courts of the United States un-
der a uniform standard applicable both in civil and criminal
cases. That standard, derived from Rule 26 of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure, mandates the application of the
principles of the common law as interpreted by the courts
of the United States in the light of reason and experience.
The words "person, government, State, or political subdivi-
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H.R. 5463 is not yet the governing standard on questions of privi-
lege in the federal courts, it is a reasonable assumption that Arti-
cle V will be enacted in a form similar to the House-passed bill.
The House found the issues surrounding the various privileges too
controversial to do anything other than leave the law of privilege
where it was before the drafting of the proposed Federal Rules.5
Even if the Senate should attempt to codify this area of the law
of evidence, it is doubtful, given the strong feelings in the House,
that such a Senate change would be accepted in conference com-
sion thereof" were added by the Committee to the lone term
"witnesses" used in Rule 26 to make clear that, as underpresent law, not only witnesses may have privileges. The
Committee also included in its amendment a proviso modeled
after Rule 302 and similar to language added by the Commit-
tee to Rule 601 relating to the competency of witnesses. Theproviso is designed to require the application of State privi-
lege law in civil actions and proceedings governed by Erie
R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), a result in accord
with current federal court decisions. See Republic Gear Co.
v. Borg-Warner Corp., 381 F.2d 551, 555-556 n.2 (2nd Cir.
1967). The Committee deemed the proviso to be necessary
in the light of the Advisory Committee's view (see its note
to Court Rule 501) that this result is not mandated under
Erie.
The rationale underlying the proviso is that federal law
should not supersede that of the States in substantive areas
such as privilege absent a compelling reason. The Commit-
tee believes that in civil cases in the federal courts where
an element of a claim or defense is not grounded upon a fed-
eral question, there is no federal interest strong enough tojustify departure from State policy. In addition, the Com-
mittee considered that the Court's proposed Article V would
have promoted forum shopping in some civil actions, depend-ing upon differences in the privilege law applied as among
the State and federal courts. The Committee's proviso, on
the other hand, under which the federal courts are bound to
apply the State's privilege law in actions founded upon a
State-created right or defense, removes the incentive to
"shop."
5. This fact is vividly sketched out in the House debate on Pub. L. 93-
12 which expanded the time limit for congressional consideration of
the proposed federal rules of evidence, 119 CoNG. REc. H1721-29(daily ed. March 14, 1973), and in the House debate on the passage
of H.R. 5463, 120 CONG. REc. H303-05 (daily ed. Jan. 30, 1974). The
debate on H.R. 5463 was handled in a very unusual manner. The
House as a whole accepted the Judiciary Committee's recommenda-
tion that no amendments be permitted to Article V from the floor
of the House. The Judiciary Committee itself was divided on the
subject of privilege and realized that the entire House likewise would
be divided to such an extent that if amendments were permitted from
the floor to Article V, H.R. 5463 would not be passed. Id. H305. The
focus of critical comment was on the absence of three privileges:
physician-patient, marital communications and newsman-informer,
and on the treatment of the governmental information and identity
of informer privileges. 119 CONG. Rrc. H1721-29 (daily ed. March 14,
1973).
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mittee. Thus the law of privilege in the federal courts will prob-
ably be that embodied in H.R. 5463, rather than that codified in
the federal proposal used as a model by the Nebraska drafters.
Therefore, an examination of the federal law of privilege as pro-
posed under H.R. 5463 is necessary so that the debate on the Ne-
braska Rules can be carried out with full knowledge of the federal
privilege rule.
Il. RULE 501
There is a significant difference in overall treatment of the
question of privilege between the Nebraska proposal and H.R. 5463.
The Nebraska Rules state that there is no privilege not to give
evidence, unless required by the United States Constitution, the
Constitution of the State of Nebraska, an act of Congress, an act
of the Nebraska Legislature, the proposed rules or other rules
adopted by the Supreme Court of Nebraska. H.R. 5463, on the
other hand, states that the question of privilege shall be governed
by the common law as interpreted by the federal courts, unless
otherwise required by the Constitution of the United States, the
rules of the United States Supreme Court prescribed pursuant to
statutory authority, an act of Congress or state law in civil actions
in which state law supplies the rule of decision concerning an ele-
ment of a claim or defense.
In the proposed Nebraska Rules, the rules themselves are the
usual standard for determining questions of privilege. The law
of privilege in the federal courts under H.R. 5463, on the other
hand, has two primary sources. In cases where state law supplies
the rule of decision on the merits, the federal court is to apply
the state law concerning privilege. For example, if a Nebraska
citizen sued a citizen of Iowa in federal district court in Nebraska
for breach of contract, the federal district judge would follow the
Nebraska Rules on privilege, if these proposed rules become the
law of Nebraska. In cases based on federal questions, the federal
district court would apply the rules of privilege as found in the
reported decisions of the federal courts. The question of privilege
would be a common law question and like any such question would
be open to reasoned departure from past decisions. The principle
that state law concerning privilege governs in diversity jurisdiction
and other similar cases is of critical importance since it will sub-
stantially reduce, if not eliminate, forum-shopping based on evi-
dentiary privileges.
The federal law described in the sections to follow is that law
which would apply in federal question cases in federal court; the
source of that law is reported federal decisions.
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IV. RULE 502
There is no Rule 502 in the Nebraska proposal, since Rule 501
allows a privilege where required by statute either by Congress
or the state legislature. The Federal Rule 502 raises the interest-
ing question of how in federal question cases the federal courts
should treat claims of privilege grounded on a state statute mak-
ing certain reports privileged matters. There would, of course, be
no question in a suit based on diversity of citizenship, since in such
cases state law would govern on the question of privilege.6 In fed-
eral question cases, there is no clear answer. There are only two
cases decided by the federal courts in the last 35 years that are
directly on point. In Carr v. Monroe Manufacturing Co.7 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held such
state statutes are not binding on federal courts in federal question
cases. Just the opposite result was reached in Tollefsen v. Phil-
lips8 by the United States District Court for the District of Massa-
chusetts. The Tollefsen opinion cites no authority for its position,
while the Carr court grounds its opinion in the proposition that
enforcement of federal policies demands the federal courts apply
their own rules of privilege where substantial state interests are
not infringed.9 This proposition underlying the fifth circuit posi-
tion has been adopted by the majority of federal courts,10 but there
are dissenting voices." The commentators also disagree on what
the effect of state-created privileges should be in federal court in
federal question litigation. 1 2  Therefore, under the proposed Ne-
6. H.R. 5463.
7. 431 F.2d 384 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1000 (1971).
8. 16 F.R.D. 348 (D. Mass. 1954).
9. 431 F.2d at 388, citing Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 1093, 1098-
99 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 974 (1971).
10. Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 1093 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
401 U.S. 974 (1971); United States v. Balistrieri, 403 F.2d 472 (7th Cir.
1968), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 953 (1971); Colton v. United States, 306
F.2d 633 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 951 (1963); In re Albert
Lindley Lee Memorial Hosp., 209 F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1953), cert. denied,
347 U.S. 960 (1954); Falsone v. United States, 205 F.2d 734 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 346 U.S. 864 (1953); United States v. Kansas City Lu-
theran Home & Hosp. Ass'n, 297 F. Supp. 239 (W.D. Mo. 1969); Dorf-
man v. Rombs, 218 F. Supp. 905 (N.D. Ill. 1963); United States v.
Summe, 208 F. Supp. 925 (E.D. Ky. 1962). See Natta v. Hogan, 392
F.2d 686 (10th Cir. 1968); Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American Gas
Ass'n, 320 F.2d 314 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 929 (1963);
United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357 (D. Mass.
1950).
11. Baird v. Koerner, 279 F.2d 623 (9th Cir. 1960).
12. C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTs 414-15 (2d ed.
1970) (favors majority position); 5 J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE
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braska Rules, privileges created by the Nebraska Legislature will
be binding on Nebraska state courts and in particular the privi-
lege granted by statute for reports submitted as required by stat-
ute. In federal court, on the other hand, such state statutory priv-
ileges will certainly be binding in diversity cases and of doubtful
authority in federal question cases.
V. RULE 503
Federal common law is in general agreement with the Nebraska
Rules on the existence and nature of the lawyer-client privilege.
First, it is clear that there is such a privilege in federal court.13
No recent federal authority is to the contrary. The only real ques-
tion is whether the scope of the federal privilege approximates that
of the Nebraska Rule. This question can best be answered by ex-
amining Rule 503 section by section.
A. Definitions
1. A Client
Federal law, like the proposed Nebraska Rule, extends the defi-
nition of client to persons, public officers,14 and corporations.' 5
1 43.07, at 1354-56 (2d ed. 1971) (favors minority position while
acknowledging contrary cases in 1973 supplement).
13. See, e.g., Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464 (1888); Chirac v. Reinicker,
24 U.S. 280 (1826); United States v. Ponder, 475 F.2d 37 (5th Cir.
1973); United States v. Bartone, 400 F.2d 459 (6th Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 1027 (1969); Natta v. Hogan, 392 F.2d 686 (10th Cir.
1968); United States v. Pappadio, 346 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1965), vacated
on other grounds, 384 U.S. 364 (1966); NLRB v. Harvey, 349 F.2d 900
(4th Cir. 1965); Continental Oil Co. v. United States, 330 F.2d 347
(9th Cir. 1964); United States v. Goldfarb, 328 F.2d 280 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 377 U.S. 976 (1964); United States v. Kendrick, 331 F.2d
110 (4th Cir. 1964); Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American Gas Ass'n, 320
F.2d 314 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 929 (1963); United States
v. Kovel, 296 F.2d 918 (2d Cir. 1961); Schwimmer v. United States,
232 F.2d 855 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 833 (1956); Wilcoxon
v. United States, 231 F.2d 384 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 943
(1956); Prichard v. United States, 181 F.2d 326 (6th Cir.), af 'd by
an equally divided court, 339 U.S. 974 (1950); Cafritz v. Koslow, 167
F.2d 749 (D.C. Cir. 1948); Modern Woodmen of America v. Watkins,
132 F.2d 352 (5th Cir. 1942).
14. Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Shields, 18 F.R.D. 448 (S.D.N.Y.
1955).
15. United States v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 236 U.S. 318 (1915);
Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 1093 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
401 U.S. 974 (1971); Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Decker, 423
F.2d 487 (7th Cir. 1970), afi'd, 400 U.S. 348 (1971); United States v.
Bar-tone, 400 F.2d 459 (6th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1027
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There is no law on the federal level on the status of associations
or other organizations or entities in the private sector. At least
one federal court has extended the privilege to cover governmental
bodies as clients. 16 There is, however, little reason to doubt that
private sector entities other than corporations would be accorded
the same protection as corporations. The rationale of the only fed-
eral case that denied status as a client to a corporation was that
at common law only natural persons could be afforded the privi-
lege and that no communication with a corporation could possess
the degree of confidentiality required by the common law privi-
lege.' 7  This rationale was rejected by the United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit sitting en banc.'8 The seventh
circuit held it was a misconception to view the origin of the privi-
lege in terms of a personal immunity. Rather, the privilege was
and is that of a client, whatever sort of entity that client is.19 It
further held that corporate communications can fulfill the requisite
confidentiality despite the necessity of working through several
agents.20 The reasoning of the seventh circuit is equally applicable
to other types of business or charitable entities. Therefore, the
privilege would surely be accorded to these entities also. Thus it
seems that the proposed Nebraska Rules and federal decisions are
in accord on who can be a client.
Federal law also extends the privilege to include persons or en-
tities seeking professional legal services who do not receive such
services from the attorney contacted.2
1
2. A Lawyer
Both federal law and the Nebraska proposal indicate that any
person authorized to practice law in any state or nation is a lawyer
(1969); Natta v. Hogan, 392 F.2d 686 (10th Cir. 1968); Radiant Burn-
ers, Inc. v. American Gas Ass'n, 320 F.2d 314 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
375 U.S. 929 (1963) (this case cites a large number of federal authori-
ties at 319 n.7).
16. Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Shields, 18 F.R.D. 448 (S.D.N.Y.
1955).
17. Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American Gas Ass'n, 207 F. Supp. 771, 773-
75 (N.D. Ill. 1962).
18. Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American Gas Ass'n, 320 F.2d 314 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 375 U.S. 929 (1963).
19. Id. at 322.
20. Id. at 324.
21. See NLRB v. Harvey, 349 F.2d 900 (4th Cir. 1965); In re Bonanno,
344 F.2d 830 (2d Cir. 1965); Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American Gas
Ass'n, 320 F.2d 314 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 929 (1963);
United States v. Goldfarb, 328 F.2d 280 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 377
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for purposes of the attorney-client privilege.22 There is no federal
law on the question of whether a person whom the client reason-
ably believes to be a lawyer qualifies as a lawyer for purposes
of this privilege. Both McCormick 23 and Wigmore 24 view the com-
mon law as extending the privilege to persons reasonably believed
to be lawyers. Given this authority, the absence of any federal
authority to the contrary, and the position of the -advisory commit-
tee which drafted the Federal Rules that the privilege should pro-
tect communications with persons reasonably believed to be law-
yers, it is probable that the federal courts would so construe the
privilege.
3. Representative of the Lawyer
Federal law, like the Nebraska proposal, accords the privilege
to communications between the client and persons employed to as-
sist the lawyer in rendering legal services.2 5 The precise scope of
this aspect of the privilege will be discussed below.
4. Confidential Communication
Federal law is in agreement with the Nebraska Rule that the
standard for confidentiality is intent not to disclose to third per-
sons who are not reasonably necessary to carry on the communica-
tion or to render the requested legal services. 26
U.S. 976 (1964); United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357 (D.C. Mass.
1950).
22. Paper Converting Mach. Co. v. FMC Corp., 215 F. Supp. 249, 251 (E.D.
Wis. 1963); cf. Garrison v. General Motors Corp., 213 F. Supp. 515
(S.D. Cal. 1963). Some language to the contrary is contained in
United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357 (D. Mass.
1950), but the court did not apply a rule that automatically excluded
attorneys who were members of some bar but not members of the
bar of the state where the privileged communication took place from
the scope of the privilege. Rather the court viewed such non-mem-
bership as indicative that the attorneys in United Shoe's patent de-
partment were not functioning in the role of an attorney and stated
that the situation would be different with regard to a visiting attor-
ney from another state.
23. C. McCopamcK, HANDBOOK or TE LAw or EvmNCu § 88 at 179 (2d
ed. 1972) [hereinafter McCoRmIcK].
24. 8 J. WIGVtoRE, EvmxxcE § 2302 at 584 (1961) [hereinafter WIGmOan].
25. United States v. Cote, 456 F.2d 142 (8th Cir. 1972); NLRB v. Harvey,
349 F.2d 900 (4th Cir. 1965); United States v. Kovel, 296 F.2d 918
(2d Cir. 1961); Cafritz v. Koslow, 167 F.2d 749 (D.C. Cir. 1948);
United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357 (D. Mass.
1950).
26. United States v. Bigos, 459 F.2d 639 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
847 (1972); Esposito v. United States, 436 F.2d 603 (9th Cir. 1970);
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B. General Rule of Privilege
Under federal law, it is clear that the privilege belongs to the
client and he may decline to reveal communications to his lawyer
or prevent others from so disclosing. 27 It is also clear that the
privilege generally extends only to communications and does not
include such things as the fact of the attorney-client relationship, 28
the identity of the client 29 or noncommunicative actions of the at-
torney or client.30 Moreover, the communications must be con-
cerned with rendering legal services. Conversations about business
or personal nonlegal problems are not privileged. 31  Finally, the
communications must be "confidential" in the sense discussed
above. In each of these respects the federal law and the proposed
Nebraska Rules are identical.
United States v. McDonald, 313 F.2d 832 (2d Cir. 1963). See United
States v. Ponder, 475 F.2d 37 (5th Cir. 1973); NLRB v. Harvey, 349
F.2d 900 (4th Cir. 1965); United States v. Kendrick, 331 F.2d 110 (4th
Cir. 1964); Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American Gas Ass'n, 320 F.2d 314
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 929 (1963); United States v. Kovel,
296 F.2d 918 (2d Cir. 1961); United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp.,
89 F. Supp. 357 (D. Mass. 1950).
27. Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 1093 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
401 U.S. 974 (1971); Republic Gear Co. v. Borg-Warner Corp., 381
F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1967); Wirtz v. Fowler, 372 F.2d 315 (5th Cir. 1966),
overruled on other grounds, 412 F.2d 648 (5th Cir. 1969); Tillotson
v. Boughner, 350 F.2d 663 (7th Cir. 1965); Schwimmer v. United
States, 232 F.2d 855 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 833 (1956).
28. In re Semel, 411 F.2d 195 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 905 (1969);
United States v. Kendrick, 331 F.2d 110 (4th Cir. 1964).
29. United States v. Ponder, 475 F.2d 37 (5th Cir. 1973); In re Seme],
411 F.2d 195 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 905 (1969); Wirtz v.
Fowler, 372 F.2d 315 (5th Cir. 1966), overruled on other grounds, 412
F.2d 647 (5th Cir. 1969). There is an exception to this general rule.
If the disclosure of the identity of the client would disclose the con-
tent of a confidential communication, the identity of the client is priv-
ileged. NLRB v. Harvey, 349 F.2d 900 (4th Cir. 1965).
30. United States v. Ponder, 475 F.2d 37 (5th Cir. 1973); SEC v. First
Security Bank, 447 F.2d 166 (10th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
1038 (1972); United States v. Brickey, 426 F.2d 680 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 828 (1970); In re Semel, 411 F.2d 195 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 396 U.S. 905 (1969); United States v. Kendrick, 331 F.2d 110
(4th Cir. 1964); United States v. Goldfarb, 328 F.2d 280 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 377 U.S. 976 (1964); Pollock v. United States, 202 F.2d
281 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 993 (1953).
31. United States v. Rosenstein, 474 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1973); Harris v.
United States, 413 F.2d 316 (9th Cir. 1969); United States v. Bartone,
400 F.2d 459 (6th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1027 (1969); Can-
aday v. United States, 354 F.2d 849 (8th Cir. 1966); NLRB v. Harvey,
349 F.2d 900 (4th Cir. 1965); Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American Gas
Ass'n, 320 F.2d 314 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 929 (1963);
United States v. Kovel, 296 F.2d 918 (2d Cir. 1961); Pollock v. United
States, 202 F.2d 281 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 993 (1953).
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The only possible difference between federal law and these
Rules is that the Nebraska Rules detail five types of protected com-
munication relationships between five different types of persons.
There is no such precise delineation under federal law. Rule 503
defines all persons except the "representative of the client." The
commentary accompanying the Rule notes that this failure to de-
fine was deliberate, since the committee thought recognition of a
representative to speak or listen for the client should be decided
on a case-by-case basis.32 The commentary indicates this problem
most often arises in the setting of corporations invoking the privi-
lege.3 3  In this setting, there is a split between the two circuits
that have considered what the proper standard should be. The
tenth circuit has held:
[T]he test is whether the person has the authority to control, or
substantially participate in, a decision regarding action to be taken
on the advice of a lawyer, or is an authorized member of a group
that has such power.34
The seventh circuit, on the other hand, has held:
[A]n employee of a corporation, though not a member of its con-
trol group, is sufficiently identified with the corporation so that
his communication to the corporation's attorney is privileged where
the employee makes the communication at the direction of his su-
periors in the corporation and where the subject matter upon
which the attorney's advice is sought by the corporation and dealt
with in the communication is the performance by the employee
of the duties of his employment.3 5
The seventh circuit decision was upheld by an equally divided
Supreme Court.86
There is apparently no case law in Nebraska on this issue.
Hence, the question of which corporate personnel are protected by
the privilege is still an open question both under federal law and
under the Nebraska proposal.
The ten protected communication relations under the Nebraska
Rules are as follows:3 7
32. PRop. NEB. R. Evm. 503, Comment [hereinafter cited as "RuLE[s]"].
33. Id.
34. Natta v. Hogan, 392 F.2d 686, 692 (10th Cir. 1968).
35. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Decker, 423 F.2d 487, 491-92 (7th
Cir. 1970).
36. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Decker, 400 U.S. 348 (1971).
37. The only communication relations between the specified parties that
are not protected are:
(a) representative of the client's attorney and the third
party's attorney;(b) representative of the client's attorney and another rep-
resentative of the client's attorney;
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(1) the client
(2) the client
(3) the representative of
the client
(4) the representative of
the client
(5) the client's attorney
(6) the client
(7) the client's attorney
(8) the representative of
the client
(9) the client
(10) the client's attorney
and the client's attorney
and the representative of
the client's attorney
and the client's attorney
and the representative of
the client's attorney
and the representative of
the client's attorney
and a third person's
attorney in a matter
of common interest
and a third person's
attorney in a matter
of common interest
and another representative
of the client
and the representative of
the client
and another attorney for
the client
Broad federal authority can be found in support of protecting all
of these relationships with the attorney-client privilege.
8
It should also be noted that the proposed Nebraska Rule for-
bids testimony by an intentional or accidental eavesdropper to at-
torney-client communications intended to be confidential, since the
Rule allows the client to prevent any other person from revealing
such confidential communications. Federal law on the eavesdrop-
per question is scant and conflicting.8 9  The advisory committee
(c) representative of the client and the third party's attor-
ney.
38. Natta v. Hogan, 392 F.2d 686 (10th Cir. 1968); Hunnydee v. United
States, 355 F.2d 183 (9th Cir. 1965); NLRB v. Harvey, 349 F.2d 900
(4th Cir. 1965); Continental Oil Co. v. United States, 330 F.2d 347
(9th Cir. 1964); United States v. Goldfarb, 328 F.2d 280 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 377 U.S. 976 (1964); United States v. Kovel, 296 F.2d
918 (2d Cir. 1961); Schwimmer v. United States, 232 F.2d 855 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 833 (1956); New York Underwriters Ins.
Co. v. Union Const. Co., 285 F. Supp. 868 (D. Kan. 1968); United
States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 193 F. Supp. 251 (N.D.N.Y. 1960);
United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357 (D. Mass.
1950).
39. United States v. Fouts, 166 F. Supp. 38 (S.D. Ohio), aff'd, 258 F.2d
402 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 884 (1958), held that the fact
that a communication was overheard did not necessarily imply that
that conversation was not confidential. United States v. Bigos, 459
F.2d 639 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 847 (1972), in a general
discussion of this privilege implied that a conversation could be
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that drafted the Federal Rules takes the same position as the Ne-
braska Rule, but this Rule is in derogation of the common law.40
Thus, it is uncertain what position the federal courts will take.
C. Who May Claim the Privilege
Under federal law, the attorney-client privilege extends beyond
the death of the client where the client is a natural person.4 1
There is no federal law on the question of whether the privilege
may be claimed by the successors, trustee or similar representa-
tive of a corporation, association or other organization. The Ne-
braska Rule does extend the privilege to such successor entities.
In so doing, it adopted the identical provision in the federal pro-
posal. What influence the proposed Federal Rules on this particu-
lar point would have on federal courts after the adoption of H.R.
5463 is a matter of pure speculation. Hence the question is an
open one in federal court.
Federal law, like the proposed Nebraska Rules, does allow the
attorney to claim the privilege on behalf of his client.4 2  Some
cases make this the attorney's duty.43 There is no recent federal
law stating directly that the attorney's authority to claim the priv-
ilege is presumed in the absence of evidence to the contrary. But
there is authority upholding the proposition by implication.4 4 This
presumption is an eminently sensible one, since it flows from the
very concept of the attorney as the representative of the client
in all that pertains to litigation. Moreover, it is the position taken
by the Federal Rules.4 5 There is sound reason to expect that the
federal courts will accept this presumption.
overheard and still remain a confidential (and therefore protected)
conversation for purposes of this privilege. On the other hand, Baker
v. Beto, 349 F. Supp. 1263 (S.D. Tex. 1972), held that when a conver-
sation is overheard, that conversation is no longer privileged.
40. WIGMORE § 2326 (1961).
41. Glover v. Patten, 165 U.S. 394 (1897); Baldwin v. Commissioner, 125
F.2d 812 (9th Cir. 1942).
42. Esposito v. United States, 436 F.2d 603 (9th Cir. 1970); Republic Gear
Co. v. Borg-Warner Corp., 381 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1967); Wirtz v.
Fowler, 372 F.2d 315 (5th Cir. 1966), overruled on other grounds, 412
F.2d 647 (5th Cir. 1969); Tillotson v. Boughner, 350 F.2d 663 (7th Cir.
1965); Bouschor v. United States, 316 F.2d 451 (8th Cir. 1963);
Schwimmer v. United States, 232 F.2d 855 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
352 U.S. 833 (1956).
43. Republic Gear Co. v. Borg-Warner Corp., 381 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1967);
Tillotson v. Boughner, 350 F.2d 663 (7th Cir. 1965); Schwimmer v.
United States, 232 F.2d 855 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 833
(1956).
44. Republic Gear Co. v. Borg-Warner Corp., 381 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1967).
45. PRoP. FED. R. EvD. 503.
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D. Exceptions
1. Furtherance of Crime or Fraud
Federal law agrees with the Nebraska Rules that communica-
tions made with an attorney for the purpose of furthering a crime
or fraud are not privileged.46 Recent federal decisions have not
considered the situation where the person seeking advice did not
know, but should have known, that what he was seeking was ad-
vice concerning a crime or fraud. The Nebraska Rules do not ap-
ply the privilege in these circumstances. The language of the pro-
posed Rule is identical to that of the Federal Rules,47 but the in-
fluence of these proposed Federal Rules on federal court decisions
cannot be ascertained at present and the question is an open one
in federal court.
2. Claimants Through Same Deceased Client
As might be expected, little federal law exists on this issue also.
What law there is accords with the Nebraska proposal that an at-
torney for a now-deceased client may not invoke the attorney-cli-
ent privilege for communications relevant to an issue between par-
ties who claim through the same deceased client.48
3. Breach of Duty by Lawyer or Client
Here again there is scant federal law, all of it concerning the
breach of duty by a lawyer. This law agrees with the Nebraska
Rule in forging an exception to the privilege where the client al-
leges that the attorney has not fulfilled his obligations toward the
client.49 Considerations of equity and the typical lack of intent
by the attorney and the client that as between themselves com-
munications relating to the tenor and terms of employment are
46. United States v. Goldenstein, 456 F.2d 1006 (8th Cir. 1972); United
Sates v. Shewfelt, 455 F.2d 836 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 944(1972); United States v. Bartlett, 449 F.2d 700 (8th Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 405 U.S. 932 (1972); United States v. Billingsley, 440 F.2d 823
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 909 (1971); United States v. Hoffa,
349 F.2d 20 (6th Cir. 1965), affd, 385 U.S. 293 (1966); Schaffer v.
Below, 278 F.2d 619 (3d Cir. 1960); United States v. Weinberg, 226
F.2d 161 (3d Cir. 1955).
47. PRop. FED. R. or Evm. 503.
48. Glover v. Patten, 165 U.S. 394 (1897); Clark v. Turner, 183 F.2d 141(D.C. Cir. 1950); Sorrels v. Alexander, 142 F.2d 769 (D.C. Cir. 1944).
49. Laughner v. United States, 373 F.2d 326 (5th Cir. 1967); Pruitt v.
Peyton, 243 F. Supp. 907 (E.D. Va. 1965); United States v. Wiggins,
184 F. Supp. 673 (D.D.C. 1960); United States v. Butler, 167 F. Supp.
102 (E.D. Va. 1957), affd 260 F.2d 574 (4th Cir. 1958).
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confidential indicate that federal courts would not grant the privi-
lege when the attorney sues the client.
4. Document Attested by Lawyer
There is no federal law at all on this point. The rule as stated
in the Nebraska Rules is in accord with the common law5° and
the Federal Rules5' in allowing testimony from an attorney who
attests a document on communications relevant to any issue con-
cerning the attested document.
5. Joint Clients
Federal law conforms with the Nebraska proposal in denying
the privilege to communications "relevant to a matter of common
interest between two or more clients if the communication was
made by any of them to a lawyer retained or consulted in common,
when offered in an action between any of the clients."' 2
VI. RULE 504
There was no physician-patient privilege at common law.5" The
development has been almost entirely statutory.5 4 Since no federal
statute grants such a privilege, it could be sensibly argued that
no physician-patient privilege exists in federal court on federal
question issues. There is, however, a split of authority in the fed-
eral courts on what role this state statutory privilege is to play
in federal question cases. The fifth circuit has made it clear, at
least in criminal cases, that federal courts are not bound to honor
state physician-patient privileges.5 5 The fourth and tenth circuits
have followed these state privileges in federal question cases. 6
The second circuit is apparently in doubt regarding what should
be done.57 The Federal Rules take the position that there should
50. MCCORMCK § 88 at 180.
51. PRop. FED. R. EviD. 503.
52. Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 1093 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
401 U.S. 974 (1971); Baldwin v. Commissioner, 125 F.2d 812 (9th Cir.
1942); Grand Trunk W. R.R. v. H.W. Nelson Co., 116 F.2d 823 (6th Cir.
1941).
53. WIGmoR § 2380 at 818-19; United States v. Harper, 450 F.2d 1032 (5th
Cir. 1971); Mariner v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 202 F. Supp.
430 (N.D. Ohio 1962); Hammones v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 243 F.
Supp. 793 (N.D. Ohio 1965).
54. Hardy v. Riser, 309 F. Supp. 1234 (N.D. Miss. 1970).
55. United States v. Mancuso, 444 F.2d 691 (5th Cir. 1971).
56. Anderson v. Reynolds, 476 F.2d 665 (10th Cir. 1972); Sas v. Maryland,
334 F.2d 506 (4th Cir. 1964).
57. Fitzgerald v. A.L. Burbank and Co., 451 F.2d 670 (2d Cir. 1970).
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be no general physician-patient privilege and limit the privilege
to communications concerning mental or emotional conditions. 58
This limitation was strongly criticized in the House debate on the
federal proposal.59 Thus, whatever weight the federal proposal
would otherwise have on federal courts has probably been muted.
The effect which the House debate will have on those circuits not
honoring state physician-patient privileges in federal question cases
is unclear. Perhaps the effect will be negligible, since the major
House concern was with the effect of these state privileges in di-
versity cases.60 The split of authority in federal decisions and the
alternative positions of the House and the Federal Rules do not
offer clear direction to the federal courts on the physician-patient
privilege in federal question cases.
VII. RULE 505
A. Confidential Communications
Federal law recognizes a privilege for confidential communica-
tions between husband and wife during the course of the mar-
riage.61 This privilege survives the death of either spouse6 2 and
is not extinguished by divorce.6 3 It does not extend to communica-
tions made before or after marriage. 64 For the privilege to obtain,
the marriage during which the communications took place must
be a valid one.65 The privilege clearly extends to utterances, and
there is some authority that it also extends to communicative
acts.66 The communications must be confidential 67 and have been
58. Prop. Fed. R. Evid. 504, Advisory Committee's Note.
59. 119 CONG. REc. H1724, H1727 (daily ed. March 14, 1973).
60. Id. H1726. See also H.R. REP. No. 650, supra note 4.
61. Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1 (1954); Blau v. United States,
340 U.S. 332 (1951); Wolfle v. United States, 291 U.S. 7 (1934); United
States v. Harper, 450 F.2d 1032 (5th Cir. 1971); Fowler v. United
States, 352 F.2d 100 (8th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 907 (1966);
Barsky v. United States, 339 F.2d 180 (9th Cir. 1964); Fraser v. United
States, 145 F.2d 139 (6th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 849 (1945);
United States v. Mitchell, 137 F.2d 1006 (2d Cir. 1943).
62. Hopkins v. Grimshaw, 165 U.S. 342 (1897); United States v. Burks,
470 F.2d 432 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
63. Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1 (1954); Volianitis v. Immigration
& Naturalization Serv., 352 F.2d 766 (9th Cir. 1965); Barsky v. United
States, 339 F.2d 180 (9th Cir. 1964); United States v. Termini, 267
F.2d 18 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 822 (1959).
64. Volianitis v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 352 F.2d 766 (9th
Cir. 1965); United States v. Mitchell, 137 F.2d 1006 (2d Cir. 1943).
65. See United States v. Neeley, 475 F.2d 1136 (4th Cir. 1973); United
States v. Boatwright, 446 F.2d 913 (5th Cir. 1971).
66. See United States v. Burks, 470 F.2d 432 (D.C. Cir. 1972); United
States v. Lewis, 433 F.2d 1146 (D.C. Cir. 1970). Contra Pereira v.
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held not to be such if made in the presence of children or other
third parties if the spouse communicating was aware of the pres-
ence of other persons. 68 To this extent, the privilege under fed-
eral law is roughly identical to that under the Nebraska proposal.
The Nebraska Rule allows a waiver of the privilege during the
period when both spouses are alive only with the consent of both
spouses. The federal law is not entirely clear, but it apparently
allows a waiver with the consent of the spouse who made the com-
munication in question even though the spouse who heard the com-
munication does not want to have it divulged. 9 The wording of
the communication privilege in the Nebraska Rule indicates that
the privilege applies only to testimony sought from either the hus-
band or the wife and not to testimony concerning marital commu-
nications overheard by third parties. That is, the Nebraska Rule
takes the position that eavesdroppers may reveal communications
between a husband and wife that were clearly intended by the
spouses to be confidential. In taking this position the Nebraska
proposal is in accord with the generally accepted common-law
view. 70 There are no reported federal cases that have considered
this question. But given the clear-cut common-law position and
the failure of the Federal Rules advisory committee to include a
privilege for marital communications 7 ' it is reasonable to assume
that federal courts will determine this privilege should be narrowly
construed. Hence accidental or intentional eavesdroppers will be
allowed to testify concerning communications between husband
and wife.
United States, 347 U.S. 1 (1954); Pool v. United States, 260 F.2d 57
(9th Cir. 1958).
67. Wolfle v. United States, 291 U.S. 7 (1934); Fowler v. United States,
352 F.2d 100 (8th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 907 (1966); Baker
v. United States, 329 F.2d 786 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 853
(1964); Tabbah v. United States, 217 F.2d 528 (5th Cir. 1955); United
States v. Brunner, 200 F.2d 276 (6th Cir. 1952).
68. Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1 (1954); Wolfle v. United States,
291 U.S. 7 (1934); Fowler v. United States, 352 F.2d 100 (8th Cir.
1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 907 (1966); Pool v. United States, 260
F.2d 57 (9th Cir. 1958); Tabbah v. United States, 217 F.2d 528 (5th
Cir. 1955); United States v. Mitchell, 137 F.2d 1006 (2d Cir. 1943).
69. United States v. Figueroa-Paz, 468 F.2d 1055 (9th Cir. 1972); Fraser
v. United States, 145 F.2d 139 (6th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 324 U.S.
849 (1945). Contra, United States v. Mitchell, 137 F.2d 1006 (2d Cir.
1943).
70. WIGMORE § 2339 at 667.
71. This position was criticized strongly in the House, 119 CONG. R c.
H1724, H1727 (daily ed. March 14, 1973), but the criticism was based
in part, at least, on the effect of the proposed Federal Rules in diver-
sity cases. There was no explicit criticism of the common law posi-
tion.
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B. Testimony Against Spouse in Criminal Case
Federal law recognizes a privilege forbidding one spouse to tes-
tify against the other spouse in a criminal case.7 2 The privilege
lasts only as long as the marriage and is extinguished by either
divorce7" or the death of one spouse.74 The marriage must be a
valid one; mere sham marriages are not sufficient to permit asser-
tion of the privilege.7 5 In these respects federal law is identical
with the Nebraska Rule.
One federal case suggests the privilege applies with equal force
in civil cases, 6 but this authority is merely dictum and is the only
federal case that could be found supporting the proposition.77 The
Nebraska Rules do not grant the privilege in civil cases.
The Nebraska Rule requires that both spouses must consent be-
fore the privilege is waived. In Wyatt v. United States,7 s the
United States Supreme Court refused to hold the privilege was
that of the party alone. The case involved a Mann Act79 prosecu-
tion in which the wife-prostitute refused to testify against her hus-
band. The Court held the defendant had no privilege to prevent
his wife from testifying where the wife was the victim of the Mann
Act offense. But the Court did not state that whenever the privi-
lege is unavailable to the defendant, it is automatically unavail-
able to the witness-spouse. The existence vel non of the witness-
spouse's privilege when the defendant has lost the privilege de-
pends upon whether "in light of the reason which has led to a
refusal to recognize the party's privilege, the witness should be
held compellable. 80 The Court decided that in light of the Con-
72. Wyatt v. United States, 362 U.S. 525 (1960); Hawkins v. United
States, 358 U.S. 74 (1958); Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1 (1954);
Lutwak v. United States, 344 U.S. 604 (1953); United States v. Moor-
man, 358 F.2d 31 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 866 (1966); Peek
v. United States, 321 F.2d 934 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 954
(1963).
73. Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1 (1954); Volianitis v. Immigration
& Naturalization Serv., 352 F.2d 766 (9th Cir. 1965).
74. United States v. Burks, 470 F.2d 432 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
75. Lutwak v. United States, 344 U.S. 604 (1953).
76. Giles v. Del Guercio, 150 F. Supp. 864 (S.D. Cal. 1957).
77. Giles relies on Wigmore as authority for the point, but Wigmore also
notes that the application of this privilege in civil cases has been
abolished by statute in so many states that it is now the general rule
that there is no such privilege in civil cases. WIGMoas § 2245 at 263.
Accord, MCCORMCK § 66 at 144.
78. 362 U.S. 525 (1960).
79. 18 U.S.C. § 2421 (1971).
80. 362 U.S. at 529.
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gressional policy embodied in the Mann Act, the witness-spouse
here could not refuse to testify. Thus Wyatt at least makes it clear
the privilege belongs to the witness-spouse. It also implies there
are cases in which a non-consenting witness-spouse can be com-
pelled to testify. It is a reasonable extension of Wyatt to hold
where the defendant-spouse waives the privilege there are circum-
stances in which the witness-spouse can be compelled to testify.
That is, there could be circumstances in which both spouses need
not consent before the privilege is waived. No federal cases have
dealt with this type of situation. This is not surprising since few
defendants would consent to testimony by their spouse that they
knew would be adverse to their criminal defense. As a practical
matter, the vesting of the privilege in both spouses rather than
the defendant spouse alone makes no difference when the question
of waiver is under consideration, since waiver by the defendant-
spouse would be extremely rare.
C. Exceptions
1. In Case of Certain Crimes
The federal law agrees with the Nebraska proposal that defend-
ants accused of certain crimes may not invoke the privilege at least
insofar as crimes against the wife by the husband are concerned.8'
Presumably in an era of expanding consciousness of sexual equal-
ity, crimes by the wife against the husband would also be held
to abrogate the privilege. There is no federal case law on the ex-
istence of the privilege when crimes against the couple's children
-are involved.8 2 Nor is there any indication from the federal cases
that rape of a person other than the spouse or incest would con-
stitute a crime against the nonoffending spouse. Hawkins v.
United States8 notes that in 1887 Congress enabled either spouse
to testify in prosecutions against the other for bigamy.8 4 This stat-
ute is no longer in effect, however;88 and no federal cases uphold
such an exception independently of this statute. Finally, several
federal cases imply that crimes against the spouse include crimes
against the spouse's property.8 6
81. Wyatt v. United States, 362 U.S. 525 (1960).
82. United States v. Shipp, 409 F.2d 33, 35 (4th Cir. 1969).
83. 358 U.S. 74 (1958).
84. Act of March 3, 1887, ch. 397, § 1, 24 Stat. 635.
85. U.S.C. Tables at 97 and 43 (1962 ed.).
86. Herman v. United States, 220 F.2d 219 (4th Cir. 1955); United States
v. Walker, 176 F.2d 564 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 891 (1949).
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2. In Cases Against Third Persons Relating to the Spouses' Mar-
riage Relationship
No federal case law exists on this exception, which usually con-
cerns cases of alienation of affection or criminal conversation. The
Nebraska Rule states the common law,87 so there is some basis for
arguing that the federal courts will adopt a position similar to Ne-
braska's.
3. In Any Case by One Spouse for Divorce or Annulment
Since such cases do not come within the jurisdiction of the fed-
eral courts, there is no federal case law on this subject either.
VIII. RULE 506
The two circuits that have considered communications with
clergymen have held that there is a privilege in federal question
cases.88 The most recent opinion by the second circuit does not
limit the privilege to confidential confessions according to pre-
scribed rubrics of the particular church involved; it extends the
privilege to any confidential communications of a penitent seeking
spiritual rehabilitation.8 9 An earlier opinion by the District of Co-
lumbia Circuit took the narrower view.90 Both decisions indicate
that the privilege belongs to the penitent and that it can be waived
by him. Neither court deals with the question of who may claim
the privilege or whether the privilege survives the death of the
penitent. Given the nature of communications to a clergyman and
the possibility that the person communicating may not be present
in court when the issue of privilege arises, it is likely that federal
law would allow the clergyman to claim the privilege on the peni-
tent's behalf and would presume such authority in the absence of
evidence to the contrary. Thus the sole potentially significant dif-
ference from the Nebraska proposal is that a federal court might
follow the narrower view of the privilege adopted by the District
of Columbia Circuit.
IX. RULE 507
There is no federal law on the question of whether there is
a privilege not to reveal how one voted in a political election. The
87. WIGMORE § 2338 at 666.
88. United States v. Wells, 446 F.2d 2 (2d Cir. 1971); Mullen v. United
States, 263 F.2d 275 (D.C. Cir. 1958). One district court has also rec-
ognized the existence of the privilege. In re Verplank, 329 F. Supp.
433 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
89. United States v. Wells, 446 F.2d 2 (2d Cir. 1971).
90. Mullen v. United States, 263 F.2d 275 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
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common law as developed by the state courts is unanimous, how-
ever, that there is such a privilege.9 Thus the federal courts
would undoubtedly accord with the Nebraska proposal especially
since this position also was adopted by the Federal Rules.92  The
exception for votes cast illegally is similarly rooted in the common
law93 and would probably be followed in federal court.9 4
X. RULE 508
Commentators differ on whether there is a privilege not to re-
veal trade secrets in federal court.95 Examination of the cases 'and
the wording of the privilege by those contending there is such a
privilege reveals that the dispute is largely a matter of semantics.
Older federal authority holds there is such a privilege unless the
revelation is necessary for the ascertainment of truth.96 More re-
cent federal cases have split on this point. The majority holds
against such a privilege but permits a trial court to exercise its
discretion to avoid unnecessary disclosure of such information, par-
ticularly where the action is between competitors.9 7 The eighth
circuit has held such matters are privileged at least where the ma-
terial sought is not relevant to the issue before the court.98 Each
of these lines of authority can be reconciled with the Nebraska
Rule. In essence, the federal cases indicate there is no absolute
privilege not to disclose trade secrets; any disclosure should be nec-
essary to the determination of the truth; and the federal courts
can fashion orders protecting a person from the unnecessary dis-
closure of these secrets and aiding the ascertainment of truth. The
Nebraska proposal grants to the state courts the same power that
federal courts have been exercising in dealing with trade secrets.
91. WiGmORE § 2214 at 163.
92. PRop. FED. R. EvmD. 507.
93. WIGmORE § 2214 at 163.
94. The fact that this is in accord with the Federal Rules of evidence
lends weight to this conclusion. See PRop. FED. R. Evm. 507.
95. WIGMORE § 2212 at 155-56, states that there is such a privilege. 5 J.
MooPE, FEDERaL PRACTICE 43.07 at 1358 n.15 (2d ed. 1971), states
that there is no such privilege.
96. WIGMORE § 2212 at 157.
97. National Util. Serv., Inc. v. Northwestern Steel & Wire Co., 426 F.2d
222 (7th Cir. 1970); La Chemise Lacoste v. General Mills, Inc., 53
F.R.D. 596 (Del. 1971); Paul v. Sinnott, 217 F. Supp. 84 (W.D. Pa.
1963).
98. Peter Kiewit & Sons' Co. v. Summit Constr. Co., 422 F.2d 242 (8th
Cir. 1969).
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XI. RULE 509
A. The General Rule
The proposed Nebraska Rule granting a privilege to communica-
tions made by or to a public officer in official confidence when
the public interest would suffer by the disclosure differs in several
respects from the privilege as articulated by the federal courts.
First, the Nebraska Rule states the privilege in broad terms, rather
than delineating the specific types of governmental information
that are privileged. Federal law is reasonably clear that diplomatic
and military secrets are privileged per se.9 9 The government does
not have the burden to show the public interest would be hurt
by revealing the secret in any particular case. Under the Nebraska
proposal, should such a case ever arise in state court, presumably
the government would have to show that revelation would harm
the public interest. Such a showing could merely be perfunctory,
depending upon what standard the Nebraska courts would set in
cases involving these types of secrets.
Federal law also creates a privilege for intragovernmental opin-
ions or recommendations submitted for consideration in decision
and policy-making, when the divulgence would be contrary to the
public interest. 00 There is no broad federal privilege for third-
party communications with government officials. Such communi-
cations are privileged only if they come within the informer privi-
lege discussed below or if a specific statute confers a privileged
status upon them. By contrast, the Nebraska Rule grants such
a broad third party-government privilege if disclosure would be
contrary to the public interest. This area of federal law is also
affected by the Freedom of Information Act' 01 which amended the
Administrative Procedure Act.10 2 The Freedom of Information Act
99. United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953); Committee for Nuclear
Responsibility, Inc. v. Seaborg, 463 F.2d 788 (D.C. Cir.), application
for injunction in aid of jurisdiction denied, 404 U.S. 917 (1971); Sper-
andeo v. Local 537, Milk Drivers & Dairy Employees, 334 F.2d 381
(10th Cir. 1964).
100. Committee for Nuclear Responsibility, Inc. v. Seaborg, 463 F.2d 788
(D.C. Cir.), application for injunction in aid of jurisdiction denied,
404 U.S. 917 (1971); Ackerly v. Ley, 420 F.2d 1336 (D.C. Cir. 1969);
Davis v. Braswell Motor Freight Lines, Inc., 363 F.2d 600 (5th Cir.
1966); Machin v. Zuckert, 316 F.2d 336 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 375
U.S. 896 (1963); Brown v. United States, 58 F.R.D. 599 (S.C. 1973);
Union Oil Co. v. Morton, 56 F.R.D. 643 (C.D. Cal. 1972); Simons-East-
ern Co. v. United States, 55 F.R.D. 88 (N.D. Ga. 1972).
101. Act of June 5, 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-23, 81 Stat. 54, amending 5 U.S.C.
§ 552 (1964).
102. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-59 (1964).
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does not purport to set up rules governing the introduction of evi-
dence in federal court. It does, however, give an indication of the
areas which Congress considers sensitive and thus worthy of pro-
tection by an evidentiary privilege.
B. Procedures
The federal courts have generally followed the procedures de-
tailed in United States v. Reynolds.103 The privilege belongs to
the government and may be claimed only upon formal request by
the head of the department which has control over the matter after
actual personal consideration by that officer. The Nebraska pro-
posal differs from federal law in that the privilege may be claimed
not only by the chief officers of the relevant governmental depart-
ment but also by the public officer sought to be examined. Whether
a showing that the disclosure is contrary to the public interest may
be made in writing does not appear to have been raised in the
federal courts. There is no reason such a showing would not be
acceptable in appropriate circumstances.
Federal courts traditionally have resorted to in camera proceed-
ings to resolve questions of privilege in this sensitive area.10 4 No
rule requires that all counsel be entitled to inspect the showing,
at least where the showing itself will divulge the matter the gov-
ernment wishes to keep secret. Under usual federal procedures
the nongovernmental party(s) would be advised of the govern-
ment's claim of privilege at the discovery stage, at the pretrial con-
ference, or at trial itself; and usually would have an opportunity
to argue to the court concerning the invocation of the privilege.
The Nebraska Rule sets forth different procedure, entitling all coun-
sel to inspect the showing and the claim and to argue the exist-
ence of the privilege to the judge. Finally, federal law parallels
the Nebraska Rule in granting the judge broad -discretion to fash-
ion protective orders in making his determinations of privilege for
state secrets.10 5
103. 345 U.S. 1 (1953). See Committee for Nuclear Responsibility, Inc.
v. Seaborg, 463 F.2d 788 (D.C. Cir.), application for injunction in aid
of jurisdiction denied, 404 U.S. 917 (1971); Carr v. Monroe Mfg. Co.,
431 F.2d 384 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1000 (1971); Ma-
chin v. Zuckert, 316 F.2d 336 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 896
(1963); Carter v. Carlson, 56 F.R.D. 9 (D.C. 1972).
104. See, e.g., Committee for Nuclear Responsibility, Inc. v. Seaborg, 463
F.2d 788 (D.C. Cir. 1971), application for injunction in aid of jurisdic-
tion denied, 404 U.S. 917 (1971).
105. Carr v. Monroe Mg. Co., 431 F.2d 384 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 1000 (1971); Machin v. Zuckert, 316 F.2d 336 (D.C. Cir), cert.
denied, 375 U.S. 896 (1963); Simons-Eastern Co. v. United States, 55
F.R.D. 88 (N.D. Ga. 1972).
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C. Notice to the Government
No federal cases have considered what a judge should do if
there is a substantial possibility that a claim of privilege would
be appropriate and such claim is not made because of oversight
or lack of knowledge. Reynolds is clear authority for the proposi-
tion that the appropriate public officer must make formal demand
before the privilege can be invoked. This does not mean that the
court is forbidden to call to that officer's attention the possibility
of invoking the privilege. But stating that the court may give such
notice is quite different from stating that the court is required
to do so. The Nebraska proposal requires the court to give this
notice. Any such requirement in federal court must come from
future decisions or an act of Congress.
D. Ffect of Sustaining Claim
The Nebraska Rule grants the court the power to make any
further orders in support of its determination that the interests
of justice require. In this respect, federal law is similar to the
Nebraska proposal, although there are certain limitations on what
the federal court can do when the federal government is a defend-
ant. 0 6 For example, if sued under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 0 7
the federal government may not be found liable for damages
sought in the case in chief simply because it insists on asserting
an evidentiary privilege. Congress has not consented to the gov-
ernment being subjected to liability in this instance.10 8
XII. RULE 510
A. Rule of Privilege
The federal law is in general agreement with the Nebraska pro-
posal that the government has a privilege not to reveal the identity
of a person who acts as an informer to government investigators 09
The privilege belongs to the government" and is limited simply
to not revealing the identity of the informer."' It does not protect
communications with the informer unless revealing the commu-
106. McCoRMvCK § 109 at 234.
107. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1970) and 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-80 (1970).
108. 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (1970).
109. McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300 (1967); Rugendorf v. United States,
376 U.S. 528 (1964); Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53 (1957).
110. Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53 (1957).
111. See, e.g., Hodgson v. Charles Martin Inspectors of Petroleum, Inc., 459
F.2d 303 (5th Cir. 1972).
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nications would disclose his identity.112 There is considerable au-
thority that the privilege extends beyond criminal investigations
to investigations of administrative bodies in civil cases.113  No fed-
eral cases have granted the privilege where a person gives informa-
tion to a member of a legislative committee or its staff conducting
an investigation. But the extension of the privilege by federal
courts beyond strictly criminal investigations indicates that they
would probably extend the privilege to cover informers to legisla-
tive bodies.
B. Who May Claim the Privilege
Few federal cases have considered who may claim the privilege.
No one would quarrel with the formulation in the proposed Ne-
braska Rule that the appropriate representative of the government
is the person who may claim the privilege. Normally the appro-
priate person is the attorney for the government. The case law
reveals, however, that the appropriate person is not always the
attorney for the government." 4
As noted in the introduction, the tenor of this article is meant
to be expository rather than critical. This section of Rule 510,
however, requires a departure from exposition on the statement
of the rule regarding relationships between the various govern-
mental entities. The proposed Rule 510(b) is a verbatim reproduc-
tion of the Federal Rule 510 (b). In the transition to a state setting
this rule did not receive sufficient attention. The proposed Ne-
braska Rule grants to the federal government the final decision
on whether the privilege will be invoked in state criminal cases
where an agent of the federal government is involved.115 In such
112. Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53 (1957).
113. Hodgson v. Charles Martin Inspectors of Petroleum, Inc., 459 F.2d 303
(5th Cir. 1972); Wirtz v. Rosenthal, 388 F.2d 290 (9th Cir. 1967);
Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. City of Burlington, 351 F.2d 762 (D.C.
Cir. 1965); Mitchell v. Bass, 252 F.2d 513 (8th Cir. 1958).
114. See Bocchicchio v. Curtis Publishing Co., 203 F. Supp. 403 (E.D. Pa.
1962), in which a local police officer claimed the privilege.
115. Most likely the federal agent would be involved as a witness in a
prosecution in which both state and federal authorities had conducted
a preliminary investigation. The Rule grants the decision to the fed-
eral government since the term "government" as used in Rule 510 (b)
is contrasted with the term "appropriate representative of a state or
subdivision." In the proposed Federal Rules, the term "government"
clearly applies to the federal government and the proposed Nebraska
Rule is taken word for word from those Federal Rules. This fact
together with the contrasting usage of the terms "state" and "govern-
ment" means that the only reasonable referent of the term "govern-
ment" in Rule 510(b) is the federal government. This problem of
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cases it would be acceptable for an agent of the federal government
to claim the privilege if he were the person with whom the in-
former conversed. But the final decision on whether to assert the
privilege should rest with the state authorities prosecuting the
case.
C. Exceptions
1. Voluntary Disclosure: Informer a Witness
Federal law, like the Nebraska Rule, holds that there is no priv-
ilege where the identity of the informer has been revealed to those
who would have cause to resent the informing.1 " The privilege
is lost in such circumstances whether the revelation of the identity
is by the government or by the informer himself. 1 7 In Smith v.
Illinois,' 8 the United States Supreme Court held the government
may not suppress the informer's true name and address, where the
informant was the principal prosecution witness. The seventh cir-
cuit has distinguished Smith as not applicable to a case where the
informant was not a principal or crucial prosecution witness."19
Thus it is questionable whether in federal court the use of the
informer as a witness automatically implies that his true identity
must be revealed. The Nebraska Rule makes disclosure of identity
mandatory if the informer appears as a witness, however insignif-
icant a witness he may be.
2. Testimony on Merits
In Roviaro v. United States, 20 the United States Supreme Court
held that where disclosure of the identity of the informer or the
contents of his communication is relevant to the defense of an ac-
cused or is essential to a fair determination of a cause, the privilege
not to disclose the identity of the informer is not applicable. If
the government refuses to give the identity, the court may dis-
miss the action. In Rugendorf v. United States,'2 ' the petitioner
terminology extends throughout Rule 510. Therefore, the Rule should
be redrafted to make clear the relative roles of the state and federal
governments in proceedings in Nebraska courts where the privilege
for identity of an informer is at issue.
116. Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53 (1957); United States v. Day,
384 F.2d 464 (3d Cir. 1967).
117. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. City of Burlington, 351 F.2d 762 (D.C.
Cir. 1965).
118. 390 U.S. 129 (1968).
119. United States ex rel. Abbott v. Toomey, 460 F.2d 400 (7th Cir. 1972).
120. 353 U.S. 53 (1957).
121. 376 U.S. 528 (1964).
PRIVILEGES
argued for an extension of Roviaro to cases where the issue was
probable cause for search. The court held that where probable
cause existed without disclosure of the identity of the informer,
the identity need not be divulged unless the defendant could show
that the informer's testimony would help prove the defendant's
innocence. This same position was upheld in McCray v. Illinois. 22
Thus under federal law there are two sets of circumstances in
which the identity of the informer is not privileged: First, where
disclosure is relevant to establishing the innocence of the defend-
ant; and second, where disclosure is necessary to establish probable
cause for search or arrest. More will be said about this second
set of circumstances below.
Under the Nebraska Rule, the privilege not to disclose is abro-
gated only if the testimony of the informer is necessary to a fair
determination of guilt or innocence. This standard differs from
Roviaro in two significant respects. First, the Nebraska proposal
is concerned with the relevance of the informer to determination
of the issue of guilt or innocence by the fact-finder. Under the
Nebraska Rule, it is possible for a judge to hold the privilege in-
applicable in cases where his testimony would clearly help estab-
lish the truth, but the testimony might aid or hinder the defense.
The federal standard announced in Roviaro is open to dispute. In
the same sentence, the court speaks of relevance to aiding the de-
fense and to a fair determination of the cause. The majority of
lower federal courts which have applied Roviaro have taken the
position that relevance to the defense is controlling in criminal
cases. 12 3 This formulation of the Roviaro rule is understandable,
since it is the defendant who seeks disclosure of the identity of
the informer. But federal courts also have indicated fair deter-
mination of the issue of guilt or innocence is the ultimate concern.
Federal authority is unanimous that mere defense speculation that
disclosure will be helpful is not sufficient to abrogate the privi-
lege.124  In cases where the testimony of the informer would
122. 386 U.S. 300 (1967).
123. United States v. Willis, 473 F.2d 450 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S.
908 (1973); United States v. Alvarez, 472 F.2d 111 (9th Cir. 1973);
United States v. Cantor, 470 F.2d 890 (3d Cir. 1972); United States
v. Waters, 461 F.2d 248 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 880 (1972);
United States v. Skeens, 449 F.2d 1066 (D.C. Cir. 1971); United States
v. Barnett, 418 F.2d 309 (6th Cir. 1969). Contra, United States v. Or-
tega, 471 F.2d 1350 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 948 (1973);
United States v. Johnson, 467 F.2d 630 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied,
410 U.S. 932 (1973); United States v. Hurse, 453 F.2d 128 (8th Cir.
1972).
124. United States v. Alvarez, 469 F.2d 1065 (9th Cir. 1972); United States
v. Picard, 464 F.2d 215 (1st Cir. 1972); United States v. Waters, 461
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clearly help determine the truth of the matter but might not aid
the defense, one cannot predict the federal court's response if the
defendant pressed for disclosure. Such cases would be rare in any
event. Second, the Nebraska proposal adopts a stringent standard
for relevance. The testimony of the informer must be necessary
for the ascertainment of truth. In the federal courts, on the other
hand, there is a split of authority on what showing a criminal de-
fendant must make to abrogate the privilege. Some courts hold
disclosure is required if the informer's testimony might be relevant
to the defense and it is made to appear on balance that justice
would best be served by disclosure.12 5 Other courts hold the de-
fendant has a heavy burden to establish the identity of the inform-
ant is necessary to his defense. 26 The split of authority is fairly
even, with conflicting formulations within circuits. It is impossi-
ble to predict whether the federal courts will adopt the latter ap-
proach and thus approximate the proposed Nebraska Rule.
The few federal courts that have considered the problem in the
context of a civil case have adopted that part of the Roviaro stand-
ard which approximates the Nebraska Rule, holding the privilege
will be abrogated if necessary for a fair determination of the
cause.127
Federal courts have used the in camera procedure for deciding
whether the privilege must be denied, but there is no requirement
that this procedure be used.12 8  Nor is there any requirement that
all counsel be present at any stage at which counsel for any party
is permitted to be present. 29 The remedy in a criminal case where
the judge determines that disclosure is necessary and the govern-
ment refuses to disclose is dismissal of the charges.3 0 In civil
F.2d 248 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 880 (1972); United States
v. Skeens, 449 F.2d 1066 (D.C. Cir. 1971); United States v. Newsome,
432 F.2d 51 (5th Cir. 1970).
125. United States v. Willis, 473 F.2d 450 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S.
908 (1973); United States v. Alvarez, 469 F.2d 1065 (9th Cir. 1972);
United States v. Waters, 461 F.2d 248 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 880 (1972).
126. United States v. Alvarez, 469 F.2d 1065 (9th Cir. 1972); United States
v. Skeens, 449 F.2d 1066 (D.C. Cir. 1971); United States v. Barnett,
418 F.2d 309 (6th Cir. 1969).
127. See note 113 and cases cited therein supra.
128. See, e.g., United States v. Ortega, 471 F.2d 1350 (2d Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 411 U.S. 948 (1973); United States v. Davis, 461 F.2d 1026 (3d
Cir. 1972); Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. City of Burlington, 351 F.2d
762 (D.C. Cir. 1965); Continental Coatings Corp. v. Metco, Inc., 50
F.R.D. 382 (N.D. Ill. 1970).
129. At least no such requirement was discussed in any of the cases ex-
amined in researching this article.
130. Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53 (1957).
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cases the federal courts, like the Nebraska courts under the Ne-
braska proposal, have the power to make any order that justice
requires.1 31 The practice of sealing evidence for disclosure only
for purposes of appellate review is followed in the federal courts.
3. Legality of Obtaining Evidence
Where the issue is the legality of the means by which evidence
was obtained, federal law is in general accord with the proposed
Nebraska Rule. The judge may require the disclosure of the in-
former's identity, if he is not satisfied that the information upon
which the affidavit seeking the warrant is based is reliable. 1 32 As
noted above, the disclosure is not necessary if the judge determines
that there was probable cause for the issuance of the warrant with-
out the disclosure. The federal courts have used the in camera
proceeding required under the Nebraska Rule at the government's
request, but no court has yet held this to be required procedure
in federal court.13 3 Nor are there cases detailing the procedure
for preserving a record of the in camera disclosure for possible
appeal. Finally, there is no federal authority providing contents
of the in camera proceeding may only be revealed to third persons
other than the court of appeals with the consent of the govern-
ment. These procedures detailed in the Nebraska Rule are reason-
'able ones and may well be followed in the federal courts.
XIII. RULE 511
Federal law, like the Nebraska Rule, holds any of the above-
mentioned privileges may be waived by voluntary disclosure of the
privileged matter. 3 4 Federal law also agrees with the Nebraska
proposal that voluntary disclosure of any significant part of the
privileged matter waives the privilege as to all of the matter. 33
131. See note 113 and cases cited therein supra.
132. McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300 (1967); Rugendorf v. United States,
376 U.S. 528 (1964); United States v. Johnson, 467 F.2d 630 (2d Cir.
1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 932 (1973); United States v. Waters, 461
F.2d 248 (1oth Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 880 (1972); United States
v. Hurse, 453 F.2d 128 (8th Cir. 1972); Walsh v. United States, 371
F.2d 436 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 947 (1967).
133. United States v. Hurse, 453 F.2d 128 (8th Cir. 1972).
134. United States ex rel. Touhy v. Ragan, 340 U.S. 462 (1951); Westing-
house Elee. Corp. v. City of Burlington, 351 F.2d 762 (D.C. Cir. 1965);
McGlothan v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 170 F.2d 121 (3d Cir. 1948);
United States v. Krulewitch, 145 F.2d 76 (2d Cr. 1944).
135. United States v. Woodall, 438 F.2d 1317 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
403 U.S. 933 (1971); Feldman v. Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Company,
142 F.2d 628 (8th Cir. 1944); Lee Nat'l Corp. v. Deramus, 313 F. Supp.
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No federal case has considered the effect of a voluntary disclosure
which is itself a privileged communication. The proposed Ne-
braska Rule providing for a waiver in this situation follows log-
ically from the very concept of a privileged communication. That
is, the voluntary disclosure in a privileged setting could not itself
be put in evidence. Therefore it could not be known that what
transpired in the privileged setting was in fact a disclosure of
otherwise privileged matter.
XIV. RULE 512
Scant federal law exists on both of the areas covered by this
Nebraska proposal. If the matter has previously been disclosed
under compulsion, one case has held such disclosure waives the
privilege.'3 6 The Nebraska Rule, on the other hand, states that
such disclosure does not waive the privilege. The authority of the
federal case is dubious since the advisory committee for the Federal
Rules adopted a rule identical to that of the Nebraska proposal.
There is no federal law on the existence of the privilege if the
matter had been previously disclosed in circumstances where the
holder of the privilege had no opportunity to claim the privilege.
The Federal Rules are in accord with the proposed Nebraska
Rules,'3 7 but this is of uncertain significance in future federal deci-
sions.
XV. RULE 513
A. Comment on Inference Not Permitted
The Nebraska proposal prohibits comment upon the exercise of
any privilege and states that no inference may be drawn from that
exercise. Federal authority is split on the question. 38  Since a
sizeable body of federal law is lacking, it may well be that future
224 (Del. 1970); IBM v. Sperry Rand Corp., 44 F.R.D. 10 (Del. 1968);
Wild v. Payson, 7 F.R.D. 495 (S.D.N.Y. 1947); In re Associated Gas
& Elec. Co., 59 F. Supp. 743 (S.D.N.Y. 1944). Contra, United States
v. Predish, 290 F. Supp. 268 (S.D. Fla. 1968).
136. Fraser v. United States, 145 F.2d 139 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 324 U.S.
849 (1944).
137. PRop. FED. R. Evin. 512.
138. Cases permitting the inference in allowing the comment are United
States v. Costello, 221 F.2d 668, 674-75 (2d Cir. 1955), aif'd, 350 U.S.
359 (1956); United States v. Fox, 97 F.2d 913 (2d Cir. 1938). Cases
forbidding any such comment are Courtney v. United States, 390 F.2d
521 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 857 (1968); A.B. Dick Co. v.
Marr, 95 F. Supp. 83 (S.D.N.Y. 1950). MCCORICK § 76 at 156 states
that the law of these latter cases is the law that should be followed.
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federal courts will be influenced by the advisory committee's
stance that no comment should be permitted. 139 This is at best
a hypothesis and the question remains an open one in the federal
courts.
B. Claiming the Privilege Without Knowledge of the Jury
Federal law is in accord with the Nebraska proposal requiring
that, where practicable, claims of privilege be made outside the
presence of the jury.140
C. Jury Instruction
The Nebraska proposal requires an instruction be given to the
jury that no adverse inference may be drawn from the exercise
of a privilege if the attorney for the party against whom the in-
ference might run requests it. As noted above, there is a split
of authority in the federal courts on whether such an inference
is permissible. Thus, there would be a split of authority on whether
such a requested instruction must be given.
XVI. CONCLUSION
This article is intended as a commentary on Article V of the
Nebraska Rules, updated to reflect the differences between these
rules and the federal law of evidence as it would be if H.R. 5463
becomes law. This commentary has revealed some marked differ-
ences between these rules and federal law. On balance, however,
the differences are far outweighed by the similarities. With the
exception of the physician-patient privilege, federal law recognizes
the same types of privilege specifically recognized by the Nebraska
proposal. Minor differences exist in the details of the individual
privileges. A substantial number of these differences are attribut-
able to the specificity inherent in codifying common law rules and
the fact that several positions taken by the Nebraska Rules have
not yet been raised for federal decision in published opinions.
A substantial question remains concerning the applicability of
state statutory privileges, aside from those specifically mentioned
139. PRoP. FED. R. or EvD. 513, Advisory Committee's Note.
140. Courtney v. United States, 390 F.2d 521 (9th Cir.) cert. denied, 393
U.S. 857 (1968); Tallow v. United States, 344 F.2d 467 (1st Cir.
1965); San Fratello v. United States, 343 F.2d 711 (5th Cir. 1965);
United States v. Tornaiolo, 249 F.2d 683 (2d Cir. 1957); McClanahan
v. United States, 230 F.2d 919 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 824(1956); United States v. Cotter, 60 F.2d 689, 691 (2d Cir. 1956), cert.
denied, 287 U.S. 666 (1932).
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in these rules, in federal-question cases in federal court. Thus,
there could be a large number of communication relationships priv-
ileged by state statute that would not be privileged in federal court
in federal-question cases. This would depend upon state statutes
other than these proposed rules, the position federal courts would
take on the applicability of these state statutory privileges, and
the existence of a federal statutory privilege for these types of
communication relationships. While federal law generally recog-
nizes the types of privilege specifically mentioned in the Nebraska
proposal, it might not recognize other types of privilege created
by state statute that are not specifically mentioned in the Nebraska
Rules.141
Placed in this perspective, the differences between the Nebraska
Rules and the federal law under H.R. 5463 do not require alteration
of the Nebraska Rules.
First, eliminating a codification of federal law on privilege
should not discourage the enactment of such a code for Nebraska
law. Article V will aid the state bar and bench in making the
rapid determinations called for by evidentiary questions. It will
provide sure guidance to federal courts in cases founded on diver-
sity of citizenship and in other cases where state law provides the
rule of decision on the merits. Moreover, the common law of Ne-
braska and the statutory elaboration of that law by the Unicameral
provides a cohesive basis for codification. Finally, codification
presents an opportunity for the elected representatives of the peo-
ple to make policy decisions having extensive ramifications outside
the courtroom. Such decisions otherwise would be made piece-
meal by judges who might not be as responsive as the legislators
to collective insight on these important social questions.
Second, the differences in substance are not so numerous that
they could not be readily learned by a neophyte litigator.
Third, there is no guarantee that over time the federal law will
remain as it is now. The common law is not static. Modeling
the Nebraska Rules on the federal proposal made good sense, since
federal codification of the law of privilege would have given that
141. One helpful addition to the codification of the law of privilege in Ne-
braska would be an appendix that included a reference to all eviden-
tiary privileges granted by state statute that are not specifically men-
tioned in the Nebraska proposal. Such privileges as those covering
the content of certain reports to the government and the recently en-
acted privilege for newsmen would thus be easily ascertainable. This
would make the Nebraska Rules a complete codification of the rules
regarding privilege. Such an appendix should be updated whenever
the legislature alters these statutory privileges in any way.
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body of law more stability than proposed under H.R. 5463. Alter-
ing these Nebraska Rules to coincide detail for detail with the fed-
eral law on privilege under H.R. 5463 invites constant amendment
to the Nebraska Rules as the federal law is developed by the fed-
eral courts. Such an alteration is unnecessary particularly since
the differences generally involve details.
The really difficult value judgments remain. The Nebraska
proposal could require substantial alteration if examined from the
perspective of ultimate social purposes. For example, revisions
may be required to reflect a changing balance between judicial
truth-seeking and family harmony or executive decision-making.
Revisions are also in order if the new rules are based on faulty
factual assumptions about the relationship between evidentiary
privileges and the fostering of such goals as full disclosure of sig-
nificant facts by a patient to a physican or by a client to an at-
torney. But revisions are not necessary to effectuate closer har-
mony with federal law.
Examination of the federal law on privilege can aid in the res-
olution of the questions that remain. Federal law is a fertile
source of reasoned balancing between other societal goals and ju-
dicial truth-seeking. The wisdom and insight contained in federal
decisions, much of which is only barely hinted at in this article,
should not be neglected in answering the hard value questions
posed by the Nebraska Rules.
